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**Discussion of Each ESCUIRE Paragraph by Comparison  
With the Floor Speech**

**Paragraphs 1 and 2**

Paragraphs 1 and 2 are new words and are simply a different introduction.

**Paragraph 3**

Paragraph 3 has new wording concerning CIA meddling in policy. Although this point was made in the floor speech, Lindsay has changed the direct accusation to the impersonal "It has been alleged." He also inserts some discussion of South Vietnam.

**Paragraph 4**

Discusses the Bay of Pigs in slightly different words than the floor speech and uses the new phrase "not only was CIA shaping policy but that policy was patently at odds with State Department thinking."

**Paragraph 5**

This is new and is an assertion that Lindsay's information and premises arise only from material and information available to the public.

**Paragraph 6**

Discusses the intermingling of intelligence gathering and operations in only slightly different words than in the floor speech.

**Paragraph 7**

A verbatim lift from the floor speech mentioning Sherman Kent and quoting a statement from Kent's book.

**Paragraphs 8 and 9**

Refers to the role of CIA in the Mossadegh overthrow and the Arbenz overthrow but unlike the floor speech the **ESQUIRE** article explicitly concedes that these were highly desirable actions which benefited the Free World.

**Paragraph 10**

Paragraph 10 is a new thought referring to the explosive nature of CIA's operational involvement in international politics. It comments on the fact that CIA is now institutionalized in the Government in its "very large permanent building" and concludes that there is no effective check on its activities now, and none in 1961.

**Paragraph 11**

Uses new words to discuss generally the previously raised point that he abhors government by secrecy and that secrecy breeds secrecy.

**Paragraph 12**

The first part of this paragraph refers to the efforts of Hexter and Dulles to sort out relations between State and CIA and is verbatim lift from the floor speech. In this same paragraph he gives a curious twist to the President's public statement on CIA and Vietnam, stating that "The President found it necessary to reassert publicly his authority and that of the Secretary of State and the National Security Council over the Intelligence community." A defense of CIA by the President has been turned by Lindsay into a public admonition to the intelligence community by the President.

**Paragraphs 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17**

These paragraphs discuss conduct of special operations by CIA, the Taylor Committee and Baldwin in the **NEW YORK TIMES**. All are verbatim lifts from the floor speech.

**Paragraph 18**

**This is a new point with Lindsay asserting that all people in the Agency but the Director are career officials and not politically responsive to the President. He makes the mistake of stating that CIA is served by only one politically responsible officer.**

**Paragraphs 19 and 20**

**These paragraphs discuss Lindsay's concern for the use of retired military officers and its reliance on the services of political refugees. Both are verbatim lifts from the floor speech.**

**Paragraphs 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25**

**These paragraphs discuss the structure of the intelligence community and intelligence evaluation, the Board of National Estimates, that "CIA is both player and umpire, both witness and judge," and that CIA is "not merely central but dominant." 99% of these paragraphs are verbatim lifts from the floor speech. However, in discussing the intelligence community, he makes the curious new and incorrect statement that "The daily chore of coordinating and cross-checking daily intelligence data is largely in the hands of the Defense Intelligence Agency."**

**Paragraphs 26, 27, 28, and 29**

**This is a rephrasing of Lindsay's basic theme that there should be a Joint Committee for Intelligence along the lines of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Fundamentally it contains the same points as his floor speech.**

**Paragraph 30**

**This paragraph discusses in slightly new language his previously made point that the four Subcommittees for CIA are not conducting adequate surveillance over CIA and adds a new point that if these Subcommittees had the time to ask for information, not even the most security-conscious official in the intelligence community would deny them access to pertinent information.**

**Paragraph 31**

Paragraph 31 is a slightly differently phrased version of his previously made point that it is argued the intelligence community exists solely to serve the President and the National Security Council and, of course, he rejects this argument.

**Paragraph 32**

Uses new words to introduce his previous point that existing congressional surveillance is not adequate.

**Paragraph 33**

Discusses the extent of congressional surveillance, using the exact words of his floor speech.

**Paragraph 34**

Refers to Lindsay's floor speech and the fact that Norblad supported him. He then quotes from Norblad.

**Paragraph 35**

Introduces a new point which can be regarded as a serious mistake. Lindsay refers to the relatively low status of the members of the four Subcommittees as follows:

"The reasons for the lack of adequate check and examination are almost self-evident: the members of the four subcommittees themselves, by definition, have relatively low status. But even had those subcommittees both status and time, the difficulties involved in dividing jurisdiction among the four would, I think, be insuperable."

**Paragraph 36**

In different phrasing, he makes the point which he had made on the floor that he recognizes a high degree of secrecy is essential to the intelligence community. He also asserts that in lieu of a Joint Committee the press "may turn out to be the only effective check on intelligence activities--and that check could be dangerous as well as disruptive."

**Paragraphs 37 and 38**

**Paragraphs 37 and 38 are new phrasing to conclude this article. He makes the point that a Joint Committee could provide a useful--perhaps an indispensable service--for the intelligence community and that it could do much to maintain a fair record. He concludes that secrecy can be a danger to our free society.**